How a Chief Minister is chosen: what the Constitution says and what Governors do

Article 164(1) is short: "The Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor". The other ministers are also appointed by the Governor, on the Chief Minister's advice, and all of them hold office during the Governor's pleasure.

The check on that power is in Article 164(2): the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly. A Chief Minister who loses the support of a majority of the House cannot govern. So although the appointment is the Governor's, in practice it has to go to someone who can carry the Assembly with them.

The Constitution does not use the phrases "single largest party" or "leader of the majority party" anywhere in these articles. Those are descriptions of what usually happens, not constitutional requirements.

You can see the results of past state contests, including who became Chief Minister, on the Chief Ministers page and in each state's history under States.

This is where Governors' choices have been most argued over. The Sarkaria Commission, as recounted in the Punchhi Commission's report on Centre-State relations, recommended an order of preference for a Governor to follow when no party wins a clear majority.

The commission also suggested the Chief Minister prove a majority on the floor of the House within 30 days. The Punchhi Commission endorsed guidelines of this kind as constitutional conventions.

These are recommendations and conventions, not binding law. Legal commentary, such as a Bar & Bench column, says the Supreme Court has never definitively endorsed the order of preference and that the law on a Governor's choice after a hung verdict remains unsettled. In the Bommai case the Court expressly declined to decide who a Governor should invite after an election with no clear majority.

Whether a government still has a majority is tested by a vote in the Assembly. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), a nine-judge bench held that the proper course for testing the strength of a ministry is "holding the test on the floor of the House", and that this is not a matter of the private opinion of any individual, be they the Governor or the President.

In Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023), a five-judge bench said a Governor's discretion to call a floor test is "not an unfettered discretion". It held that calling one needs objective material beyond a mere request, and that a floor test cannot be used to settle disputes inside a party. On the facts, the Court held the Governor was not justified in calling on Uddhav Thackeray to prove his majority, but that the Governor was justified in inviting Eknath Shinde to form the government, because Thackeray had already resigned.

• The 15% cap and the minimum of 12 came in with the 91st Amendment, in force from 1 January 2004.
• A member of either House of a state legislature who is disqualified under the Tenth Schedule is also barred from being appointed a minister for the period of disqualification (Article 164(1B)).
• A minister who is not a member of the state Legislature for six consecutive months ceases to be a minister at the end of that period (Article 164(4)). In S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab (2001) the Supreme Court held that repeatedly re-appointing a non-legislator as a minister every six months is "improper, undemocratic, invalid and unconstitutional", and that a non-member should get elected within the six months.

The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025 would provide for the removal of the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers and other ministers after 30 consecutive days in custody on serious charges. It was introduced on 20 August 2025 and referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee. It is a bill, not law, and we have not been able to confirm its current stage.